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ABSTRACT
Conventional wisdom dictates that the more citizens lean towards either end of the
ideological spectrum, the lower their support for democracy. The main model
pitted against this “rigidity-of-the-extremes model” is the “rigidity-of-the-right
model”. This model assumes that rightist citizens are less supportive. This study
proposes and empirically demonstrates the validity of an alternative model, which
we call “the authoritarian legacy model”. This model predicts that whether leftist or
rightist citizens are less supportive of democracy depends on countries’ experience
with left- or right-authoritarianism. To evaluate its validity, we present a systematic
comparative investigation of the relation between citizens’ ideological and
democratic beliefs, using European and World Values Survey data from 38
European countries (N = 105,495; 1994-2008). In line with this model, our analyses
demonstrate that democratic support is lowest among leftist citizens in former left-
authoritarian countries and among rightist citizens in former right-authoritarian
countries. We find that this relation persists even among generations that grew up
after authoritarian rule. These findings suggest that traditional ideological rigidity
models are unsuitable for the study of citizens’ democratic beliefs.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 18 June 2020; Accepted 19 September 2020
KEYWORDS Democratic support; left-right self-placement; ideological rigidity; authoritarian legacies; political
history; extremism and democracy
Introduction
Who opposes democracy? In their seminal work The Authoritarian Personality,
Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford proposed that would-be authoritar-
ians share fundamental ideological beliefs. In recent years, this work has regained sig-
nificance. The rise of radical right movements and strongman politics seem to indicate
that democracy is not fully uncontested.1 For this reason, scholarship has sought to
understand the relation between citizens’ ideological and democratic beliefs. Two
models have been proposed to study this relation. The “rigidity-of-the-extremes
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model” dictates that the more citizens lean towards either end of the ideological spec-
trum, the lower their support for democracy.2 The main theory pitted against this
model is the “rigidity-of-the-right model”. This model predicts that citizens on the
right end of the spectrum are less supportive.3 In this study, we propose a third
model, which we refer to as the “authoritarian legacy model”. This model posits that
whether leftist or rightist citizens are less supportive depends on historical experiences
with left- or right- authoritarianism. To evaluate its validity, we present a systematic
comparative investigation of the relation between citizens’ ideological and democratic
beliefs across countries.
To substantiate our argument, we combine insights from the literature on cognitive
rigidity, authoritarian legacy effects and elite behaviour in post-authoritarian
countries.4 We argue that reminders of the past regime provoke two types of responses.
The first response occurs among citizens who maintain a positive reading of the past.
These citizens may enjoy the societal order one would typically find under authoritar-
ian rule or feel that the past regime was particularly effective in catering to their ideo-
logical preferences.5 In effect, they may feel more inclined to identify with the past
regime’s ideological or democratic beliefs. The second type of response occurs
among citizens who maintain a negative reading of the past. These citizens may be
appalled by the regime’s authoritarian practices (e.g. repression and violence) or
believe that only democracies are able to cater to their ideological preferences. Conse-
quently, they may become more supportive of the regime’s antipode: pro-democratic
ideological opponents. If this is the case, leftist citizens should be less supportive of
democracy and rightist citizens more in countries such as Slovakia or Poland. Inver-
sely, rightist citizens should be less supportive and leftist citizens more in countries
such as Austria and Greece.
Our study offers several contributions. Empirically, we demonstrate that existing
models of ideological rigidity are unsuitable for the study of democratic beliefs. In par-
ticular, we refute the assumption that the relation between citizens’ ideological and
democratic beliefs is invariant across countries. This finding is consequential for com-
parative democracy research, in which it is standard practice to make such assumptions.6
Our study also offers an important theoretical refinement of arguments made in earlier
research on legacy effects in new democracies. That is, we draw on evidence that even a
distant legacy establishes pressures to reaffirm democratic values and discredit authori-
tarian ones.7 Our argument is, therefore, particularly suited to study long-term legacy
effects on citizens’ political beliefs. Methodologically, we contribute by developing non-
linear tests of our expectations. To this end, we pool data of 105,495 individuals in 38
European countries from the European and World Values Survey (1994–2008). We
take advantage of the variety of historical backgrounds to assess how the relation
between citizens’ ideological and democratic beliefs varies with countries’ political
history. We subsequently leverage variation in individuals’ birthyear to assess whether
these effects persist despite processes of generational replacement.
Theory and hypotheses
Ideological rigidity models
In the early 1950s, scholars such as Adorno and colleagues and Rokeach first articu-
lated the hypothesis that authoritarian-minded citizens are similar in their ideological
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rigidity. They argued that the defining psychological traits of these less democratic citi-
zens – e.g. intolerance, overconfidence, distress, dogmatism and simplicity – pushes
them towards certain (extreme) ideological beliefs. Popular and scholarly belief is
that these traits push less democratic citizens towards either end of the ideological
spectrum.8 Social psychologists labelled this assertion the “rigidity-of-the-extremes
model”. The main model pitted against it is called the “rigidity-of-the-right model”.
This model differs in its insistence that citizens with rightist beliefs are more cogni-
tively rigid and, thus, less supportive of democracy.9
In their current form, the predictions derived from these two models are mutually
exclusive. The reason for this is that they assume that cognitive rigidity affects citizens’
beliefs in the same way everywhere: no matter the context, less democratic citizens tend
to lean more towards either end of the spectrum or just the right end. In what follows,
we propose an alternative model to study the relation between citizens’ ideological and
democratic beliefs. We call this the “authoritarian legacy model”. To be sure, in pro-
posing this model, we do not refute the established knowledge that cognitive rigidity
constitutes the basis of citizens’ ideological and democratic beliefs. Instead, we reject
the idea that this rigidity influences mass political behaviour in different countries
in the same way.
The authoritarian legacy model
Authoritarian legacies
The central premise of authoritarian legacy research can best be understood as a cri-
ticism of the idea of a “zero hour”. This idea holds that it is possible to facilitate a
complete break with the authoritarian past and start with a clean slate.10 Authoritar-
ian legacy scholars refute this idea. They argue that one will always be able to find
traces of the past regime in the present. The vehicles of these traces may be material.
They may take on the form of literature, education, popular culture, architecture,
democratic propaganda, etcetera. The vehicles of these traces may also be human:
citizens may socialize their children into particular beliefs that they acquired due
to their experiences with authoritarianism. In effect, citizens living in former author-
itarian countries are exposed to many traces left behind by the past regime, irrespec-
tive of whether they have lived through it or not. In this study, we focus on traces
resulting from the two most salient traits of twentieth-century authoritarian regimes
in Europe, that is their authoritarianism and extreme ideologies.11 That is, commu-
nist and socialist states were authoritarian and left-wing. Others, such as Nazi
Germany or military regimes in Spain and Greece, were authoritarian and right-
wing.
The purpose of legacy research is to demonstrate that these traces affect individual,
elite and mass political behaviour. The authoritarian past, then, serves as an additional
contextual factor that one would not find elsewhere that needs to be taken into account
when studying political behaviour. In this case, authoritarian legacies may affect pol-
itical behaviour because the word “authoritarianism” calls to mind images of the past
regime. Besides, the label “left” calls to mind the images of the past regime in countries
with a left-authoritarian legacy and the label “right” in countries with a right-wing
legacy. In other words, the past creates an interpretative lens through which citizens
judge the meaning of these words.12In effect, citizens in former authoritarian countries
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are more likely to believe that their ideological and democratic beliefs say something
about their support for the past regime or its practices.
Two types of legacy effects
The connotations the word “authoritarianism” and the labels “left” and “right” have
acquired in former authoritarian countries are, therefore, hardly neutral. They evoke
specific images of what living under the rule of the past regime would look like. In
the following paragraphs, we theorize that citizens’ ideological and democratic
beliefs are (directly or indirectly) influenced by the authoritarian past. In particular,
we theorize two types of legacy effects.
This first type comprises the traditional understanding of legacy effects. It envisions
legacies as an inheritance from the past regime. This effect occurs among citizens who
maintain a positive reading of the past and adjust their political beliefs accordingly.
There are two reasons why citizens would feel more inclined to maintain such a posi-
tive reading. The first reason mirrors the argument put forward in the cognitive rigid-
ity literature.13 This explanation acknowledges that even after democratic transition,
some citizens prefer the societal hierarchy and order one would typically find under
authoritarian rule. These less democratic citizens experience democratic freedoms as
a burden rather than a privilege. Of course, the stronger these feelings are, the less
these citizens would mind identifying with the ideology of the past regime.14
A second reason why citizens would maintain a positive reading of the past regime
is that they support its ideological practices, values, or policies. These citizens feel
attracted to the ideological core of the past regime and commend authoritarian
forms of government for their ability to follow through on their promises.15 That is,
authoritarian governments need not compromise and are, therefore, particularly
effective in realizing their policies. Besides, these citizens are reminded of a time
where supporting the regime’s ideological beliefs ensured that one would be entitled
to its benefits.16 For this reason, some citizens may be more embracive of authoritarian
forms of government. For instance, in former communist countries, this should mean
that citizens who develop a typically “left-wing” (communist) preference for a planned
economy are more sympathetic towards authoritarianism.17
The theoretical mechanisms behind the first type of legacy effects have received a
substantial amount of attention in legacy literature. By contrast, this literature has
mostly overlooked the reactions among those who maintain a negative reading of
the past. However, various studies within the fields of militant democracy, party poli-
tics, and media coverage in post-authoritarian countries suggest that disassociating
oneself with the beliefs of the authoritarian predecessor is a common practice.18
Once again, there are two reasons why this type of legacy effect would occur among
citizens. First, some citizens feel appalled by the authoritarian traits of the past
regime. Their cognitive characteristics are the opposite of the would-be authoritarians
described in the work of Adorno and colleagues. They are characterized by high levels
of cognitive flexibility and commend democracy for the freedoms it grants to them and
others. These citizens remember the past regime for its atrocities, violence and repres-
sion. Of course, they are reluctant to identify with the ideology of the past regime. Even
more so, they may feel more inclined to identify with the opposite ideology, which they
might conceive as the voice of democratic activism.
Second, some citizens may be appalled by the memory of the past because they
maintain different ideological beliefs. They remember the authoritarian past as a
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time that citizens with similar ideological convictions were at risk of being persecuted
or assassinated.19 To these citizens, democracy represents a system in which they have
the freedom to express their ideological beliefs and that, to some degree, will cater to
their needs. The memory of the past may, therefore, reaffirm their democratic values.
The more citizens disagree with the ideological beliefs of the past regime, then, the
more supportive they may be of democracy.
These mechanisms need not apply to all citizens for legacy effects to occur. It is very
well possible that only a share of the population deliberately adjusts their political
beliefs in accordance with their reading of the past. That being said, the remainder
of the population may still be indirectly affected by these mechanisms. For instance,
their political beliefs may be influenced by citizens who are subjected to these mech-
anisms, or they may learn to associate the labels “left” and “right” with “good” or
“bad” in another context, without knowing its historical origins.
Empirical implications and evidence
The authoritarian legacy model has various implications for the relation between citi-
zens’ ideological and democratic beliefs. Furthermore, if we find evidence in favour of
this model, we offer an important innovation to earlier models of ideological rigidity.
Our novel model has two empirical implications. The first implication is that the direc-
tion of the relation between citizens’ ideological and democratic beliefs depends on
countries’ authoritarian history. In particular, our model predicts that lower levels
of democratic support are associated with leftist beliefs in former left-authoritarian
countries and with rightist beliefs in former right-authoritarian countries. These
expectations imply a break with earlier ideological rigidity frameworks and existing
democracy scholarship, which assume that the relation between these two beliefs is
invariant across contexts. The second implication is that the shape of this relation
depends on countries’ authoritarian history. That is, if less democratic citizens are
pushed towards one end of the spectrum and more democratic citizens towards the
opposite end, we should find that the relation takes on a more linear form in
former authoritarian countries than elsewhere. The “rigidity-of-the-extremes” model
may, therefore, only correctly predict citizens’ democratic support in countries
without a legacy of left- or right-authoritarianism. Likewise, the “rigidity-of-the-
right” model may only correctly predict citizens’ democratic support in countries
with a legacy of right-authoritarianism.
Thus far, a comprehensive analysis of legacy effects on the relation between citizens’
ideological and democratic beliefs (and the shape thereof) is still lacking. However, the
findings of extant studies in this area are consistent with our argument. Focusing on
post-war Italy, La Palombara and Waters find that support for authoritarian alterna-
tives is considerably higher among rightist (48.0%) than among leftist (42.5%) citi-
zens.20 In Central and Eastern Europe, both Dalton and Tufis reveal leftist citizens
to be least supportive of democracy.21 The data collected by the Pew Research
Center shows similar patterns, with rightist citizens being most supportive of author-
itarian alternatives in former right-authoritarian Germany and Italy. In Venezuela, a
country that has been ruled by left-wing strongmen since 1999, on the other hand,
they find leftist citizens to be most supportive of authoritarian rule.22 The argument
discussed above can bring together all these findings. In particular, we can derive
two expectations:
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Hypothesis 1: (a) Rightist beliefs are associated with lower levels of democratic support in
former right-authoritarian countries and (b) leftist beliefs in former left-authoritarian countries.
Hypothesis 2: The relation between citizens’ ideological and democratic beliefs is (a) different
in former authoritarian countries and (b) follows a more linear pattern than elsewhere.
Data and methods23
Data: European and World values study
For this study, we rely on cross-sectional survey data collected within the framework of
the European and World Values Study. The advantage of these surveys is threefold.
First, five survey-wave combinations (1994–2008) include a seven-item measurement
of democratic support, tapping into both support for democracy and the rejection of
authoritarian alternatives. Second, these surveys include all countries in the European
region, thereby ensuring a substantial variability in countries’ political history. Finally,
their over-time availability permits us to assess the durability of legacy effects. The data
in these surveys were collected through a sample representative of the adult popu-
lation, using face-to-face interviewing techniques. Countries with a history of both
right- and left-authoritarianism (i.e. Hungary and East Germany) were not included
in our analyses.24 The pooled dataset comprises 105,495 respondents in 38 countries
(country-level response rate between 71% and 89%).
Variables
This study aims to assess whether the authoritarian past affects the relation between
citizens’ democratic and ideological beliefs. In the theory section, we formulated two
arguments why this would be the case, one in which democratic support was the
dependent variable and one in which left-right orientation was the dependent variable.
Although the analysis techniques we use still require specifying one as an independent
and the other as the dependent variable, we can retain this bidirectional nature by
alternating between dependent variables. In the results section, we report the results
of two sets of analyses, one using democratic support as the dependent variable and
the other using left-right orientation. For the sake of parsimony, we only discuss the
analyses using democratic support as the dependent variable. As the remainder of
this study shows, the second set of analyses yields exactly the same conclusions.
To measure democratic support, we use an extended version of the “democracy-
autocracy index”, proposed by Pop-Eleches and Tucker.25 This index consists of
seven items on a four-point scale, ranging between “very bad” and “very good” or “dis-
agree strongly” and “agree strongly”. Support for authoritarian rule is calculated as the
mean of items asking whether respondents agreed that (1) having a leader who does
not have to bother with elections and (2) having the army govern is a good way of gov-
ernment; and that democracies (3) do not have a well-functioning economic system,
(4) are bad at maintaining order and (5) are indecisive. We use the mean of items
asking whether respondents agreed that democracy is (1) a good way of government
and (2) better than any other form of government to measure support for democratic
rule. We construct the index by subtracting support for authoritarian rule from
support for democratic rule. The outcome is an index ranging between full support
for authoritarian rule (−3) to full support for democratic rule (+3), with a Cronbach’s
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α of 0.755. Citizens’ ideological beliefs are measured using their self-placement on the
left-right dimension, originally ranging between 1 “left” to 10 “right”.
The only truly independent – and exogenous – variables in this study are countries’
and citizens’ experiences with authoritarianism. To determine countries’ experiences,
we first use V-Dem data to tentatively map all twentieth-century authoritarian
regimes.26 To avoid relying on arbitrary cut-off criteria, we pinpoint the start- and
end-dates based on identifiable historic events, such as transfers of power, coups
and the first democratic elections. Annex A.1. contains a the justification for and vali-
dation of the start- and end-dates of each regime. Countries with a mostly uninter-
rupted experience with democracy since the turn of the twentieth century are
considered democratic legacies. We classify countries with a history of fascism or mili-
tary regimes as right-authoritarian and post-socialist or post-communist countries as
left-authoritarian. The regime classification is visualized in Figure 1. We subsequently
Figure 1. Regime classification.
Notes. The start- and end-dates of each regime, as well as the justification and validation of the classifications scheme, can be
found in Annex A.1. The fill colour of countries that were excluded from the analyses is white.
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use information about respondents’ birthyear to distinguish between respondents who
have experienced authoritarian rule after the age of five and respondents who have not.
This variable enables us to assess whether country-level legacy effects persist despite
processes of generational replacement. A detailed overview of the age distribution
by country is visualized in Annex A.2.
We also include several demographic controls to factor out the possible confounding
influence of citizen characteristics. We first include two variables to permit analysis of
generational differences: a continuous measurement for citizens’ age and a dummy for
each survey-wave combination. Second, we include an ordinal variable gauging respon-
dents’ level of educational attainment, ranging between “0” no formal education to “9”
completed university-level education.27 Third, we measure political interest on an
ordinal scale ranging from “1” very interested to “4” not at all interested. Finally, we
include dummies for respondents’ sex and whether they are natives. Before running
the analyses, we inverted the scales of inversely coded items and rescaled all variables
to range between the values “0” and “1”. The summary statistics can be found in Table 1.
Analysis strategy
In analysing legacy effects, we face four methodological challenges: (1) identifying
legacy effects, (2) assessing the durability of legacy effects (3) obtaining adequate esti-
mations given our data, and (4) testing legacy effects. The first challenge involves sep-
arating legacy effects from other noise in the data. In particular, we wish to separate
variation in the relation between citizens’ ideological and democratic beliefs explained
by countries’ authoritarian past from variation explained by other factors. A good way
to deal with this is by looking at how former patterns in authoritarian countries differ
from those elsewhere. The variation they share, then, clearly has nothing to do with the
authoritarian past, and the remaining variation can be attributed to countries’ author-
itarian past. In other words, we can resolve this problem by using countries with a
democratic legacy as a benchmark.
A second challenge arises when assessing the intergenerational durability of legacy
effects. That is, it is statistically difficult to disentangle these so-called “cohort effects”
from the potentially cofounding influences of age and period. To resolve this, we use
age-period-cohort analysis techniques, which deal with this problem by including
Table 1. Summary statistics.
Variable N Mean/Prop. Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Democratic Support 105,495 1.250 1.051 -3 3
Age 105,495 0.334 0.179 0 1
Educational Attainment 105,495 0.466 0.339 0 1
Experience: No 12,340 0.156 Ref.
Yes 66,853 0.844 0 1
Left-Right 105,495 0.487 0.238 0 1
Political Interest 105,495 0.499 0.298 0 1
Sex: Male 55,296 0.490 Ref.
Female 57,481 0.510 0 1
Survey-Year: EVS 1999 26,973 0.239 Ref.
EVS 2008 41,361 0.367 0 1
WVS 1994 23,983 0.213 0 1
WVS 1999 5770 0.051 0 1
WVS 2005 14,714 0.130 0 1
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constrained specifications of age and period variables as controls. Imposing these con-
straints reduces the correlation between them. In our case, we include a dummy vari-
able for each survey-wave (i.e. period), and we constrain the coefficient of age to be
linear.28
The third challenge involves obtaining adequate estimations of our effects. Doing so
requires optimizing the estimation of the association between citizens’ left-right orien-
tation and democratic support. In particular, we wish to obtain an estimation of left-
right orientation [democratic support] for each legacy that best represents that of all
units of analysis (i.e. countries) classified under that legacy. Obtaining an adequate
estimation of the coefficient and standard error entails eliminating a possible bias
introduced by the complicated, nested structure of the data. Using multilevel analysis
techniques, with observations nested in countries, enables us to factor out the 13.63%
variance explained by the clustering of respondents within countries. Another advan-
tage of this technique is that it allows us to consciously impose and lift constraints on
the cross-national variability in the strength of individual-level coefficients. Allowing
the coefficient of left-right orientation [democratic support] to vary (i.e. random
slopes), enables us to assess whether the average value of this coefficient varies along
with countries’ authoritarian legacy. Rather than relying on the crude practice of inter-
preting p-values, we calculate 90% bootstrapped confidence intervals, thereby facilitat-
ing a 5% confidence level for our one-sided hypotheses. This procedure enables us to
obtain a sampling distribution of plausible parameter estimates, which we visualize
through coefficient plots. We consider a hypothesis fully supported when the upper
and lower bounds align with our expectations. Models 1a to 1c are based analyses of
a single legacy, using the following equation:
yij = (b0 + u0j)+ b1Ideology+ SbX + 1ij (1)
in which yij denotes the value on democratic support for individual i in country j, β0
the grand intercept, u0j the deviation between the grand intercept and the intercept for
country j, β1 the fixed effect for citizens’ left-right orientation, ΣβX the coefficients for
the control variables and εij the stochastic error for individual i in country j.Model 1d
uses the pooled data and models the interaction between countries’ legacy and citizens’
left-right orientation. The equation for Model 1d can be described as:
yij = (b0 + u0j)+ (b1 + u1j)Ideology+ b2Left Wing + b3RightWing
+b4Ideology · Left Wing + b5Ideology · RightWing + SbX + 1ij
(2)
Equation 2 differs from Equation 1 due to the addition of dummies for countries’
legacy (β2 and β3), the partition of the fixed effect for ideology into a grand coefficient
β1 and a country-random part u1j and a cross-level interaction between ideology and
legacy (β4 and β5).
The fourth and final challenge is testing legacy effects on the shape of the relation
between citizens’ ideological and democratic beliefs (Hypothesis 2b). This is a chal-
lenge parametric techniques cannot address for at least two reasons. First, parametric
techniques force us to make presumptions about the shape of these relations. This is
problematic because these techniques may provide support for any specification,
even if they are incorrect. Second, parametric techniques also do not provide a
measure of linearity. This limitation makes it difficult to test our expectations formally.
To address this challenge, we employ a nonparametric analysis technique: Generalised
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Additive Mixed Models (GAMMs). In layman’s terms, this technique allows us to drop
any presumption we might have about the shape of the relation. It furthermore ensures
that the estimated shape of the effect reflects its actual shape. It does so by lifting the
restriction that predictions must be a weighted sum of the predictors. Instead, this
technique allows the outcome to be modelled as a sum of linear terms βX, combined
with arbitrary (a priori unknown) functions f(X) for the terms of interest.
In the case of GAMMs, these arbitrary functions f(X) are (cubic) spline functions,
which can be imagined as elastic line gauges bend on certain values of the scale of the
variable of interest (i.e. “knots”). During the estimation procedure, GAMMs learn to
find the optimal position for these knots. In our case, we use these techniques to
produce smoothed curves and unbiased confidence intervals for citizens’ left-right
orientation. As Equation 3 demonstrates, the specifications of these models is the
same as for Models 1a to 1c, with the sole exception that the fixed effect for ideology
is now estimated using a spline function:
yij = (b0 + u0j)+ f (b1Ideology)+ SbX + 1ij (3)
To test Hypothesis 2b, we look at a statistic evaluating to what degree the curve
deviates from linearity: Effective Degrees of Freedom (edf). The higher the value of
this statistic, the more the curve deviates from linearity. This statistic, therefore,
allows us to formally establish whether the relation between democratic support and
left-right orientation follows a more linear pattern in former authoritarian countries.
Results
Legacy effects on the relation between citizens’ democratic and ideological
beliefs
The first and principal expectation of this study is that rightist beliefs are associated
with lower levels of democratic support in former right-authoritarian countries
(Hypothesis 1a) and with leftist beliefs in former left-authoritarian countries (Hypoth-
esis 1b). To test this, we estimate a separate linear analysis for each legacy. The results
of these analyses are presented in Models 1a to 1c in Figure 2.29
These analyses provide full support for Hypothesis 1. The negative value of the
coefficient for left-right orientation in Model 1a shows that in former right-authoritar-
ian countries, the most rightist citizens are 0.59 points (9.83%) less supportive than the
most leftist citizens. These findings are in line with the expectations formulated in
Hypothesis 1a. Likewise, the positive value of the estimate for left-right orientation
in Model 1b predicts that in former left-authoritarian countries, the most leftist citi-
zens are 0.39 points (6.50%) less supportive than the most rightist citizens, thereby pro-
viding support for Hypothesis 1b.
To ascertain that these differences can be attributed to countries’ past, we bench-
mark the coefficients for left-right orientation in countries with an authoritarian
legacy to that in countries with a democratic legacy.30 We expected this coefficient
would be significantly different in former authoritarian countries than elsewhere
(Hypothesis 2a). The main coefficient for left-right orientation in Model 1d (Figure
2) represents its correlation with democratic support in countries with a democratic
legacy, and the interaction terms represent the deviation from this coefficient in
former authoritarian countries. Model 1d fully supports our expectations. This
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model predicts that in countries with a right-wing legacy rightist citizens are 0.53
points (8.83%) less democratic and in countries with a left-wing legacy leftist citizens
are 0.33 points (5.52%) less democratic than their ideological counterparts. Elsewhere,
rightist citizens are less democratic, but this difference is 5.32% (0.24) less than in
former right-authoritarian countries. Hence, the analyses provide full support for
Hypothesis 1b.
A final expectation was that countries’ authoritarian past would encourage citizens
with a positive reading of the past to disassociate with the regime’s authoritarian and
ideological beliefs, and citizens with a negative reading to disassociate from its beliefs.
If this is the case, the relation between citizens’ ideological and democratic beliefs
should be more linear in former authoritarian countries than elsewhere (Hypothesis
2b). To test this, we calculate an edf-statistic based on the results of nonlinear analyses.
A lower value on this statistic indicates a higher degree of linearity. Figure 3 confirms
our expectations. It shows that in countries with a democratic legacy, lower support is
concentrated on both ends of the left-right spectrum. In former authoritarian
countries, by contrast, lower support is concentrated on just one end. The edf-statistics
tied to the estimations in former authoritarian countries confirm the tentative con-
clusion that the relation between left-right orientation and democratic support
follows a more linear pattern in former authoritarian countries than elsewhere. The
value of this statistic is considerably lower in these countries (7.82 in left-wing legacies,
8.05 in right-wing legacies) than that in countries with a democratic legacy (edf = 8.73).
The analyses, therefore, provide full support for Hypothesis 2b.
These findings are important for several reasons. In general, our findings suggest that
a core assumption of existing rigidity models, namely, its insistence that citizens’ demo-
cratic and ideological beliefs are related in the same way in every context, is incorrect. In
Figure 2. Linear test of legacy effects. Source. European and World Values Survey (1994-2008).
Notes. Entries are the result of multilevel analyses with observations nested in countries. Figure shows the normally distributed
sampling distributions, derived from 90% bootstrapped confidence intervals (iterations = 10.000, seed = 1993). The intercept is
not included in the visualization to increase the readability of the results. The ‘independent variable’ of the analyses is ‘left-right
orientation’ when the dependent variable is democratic support and ‘democratic support’ when the dependent variable is ‘left-
right orientation.
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addition, these findings provide support for two important refinements of extant
research on authoritarian legacies. They show that legacy effects exist in all former
authoritarian countries, new and old alike. The nonlinear analyses furthermore show
that authoritarian legacies do more than encourage citizens with a positive reading of
the past to associate themselves with the past regime’s ideological and authoritarian
beliefs: they also pressure citizens with a negative reading to disassociate themselves.31
The intergenerational durability of legacy effects
A central claim we make in our theory section is that legacy effects are able to trans-
cend generations. We perform age-period-cohort analysis to test whether this is the
case. These analyses include an interaction term between citizens’ ideology and
whether or not they have experienced authoritarian rule. The inclusion of this inter-
action term permits us to estimate a separate line for citizens who have experienced
authoritarian rule and those who grew up thereafter. The main coefficient of left-
right orientation, then, represents its association with democratic support among citi-
zens who grew up after authoritarian rule. The interaction term with experience rep-
resents the difference in the value of this coefficient for citizens who have experienced
authoritarian rule. If the main coefficient is significant, we may conclude that the
hypothesized legacy effects persist across generations.
Figure 3. Nonlinear test of legacy effects.
Notes. Figures are the result of Generalized Additive Mixed Models, with a cubic spline function estimation for citizens’ left-right
orientation (knots = 10). The grey bound represents a 95% confidence interval around the predicted value. The edf-statistics can
be read as measures of linearity and only apply to the conditional estimations. The lower the value of this statistic, the more
linear a relation is.
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The results for the linear analyses are visualized in Figure 4. The analyses provide
strong evidence that the observed legacy effects survive processes of generational repla-
cement. The main coefficient for citizens’ left-right orientation in Figure 4, Model 2a
predicts that in former right-authoritarian countries, rightist citizens born after
authoritarian rule are 0.61 points (10.17%) less democratic than their right-wing
counterparts. Likewise, the main coefficient for left-right orientation in Model 2b pre-
dicts that in former left-authoritarian countries, leftist citizens born after authoritarian
rule are 0.22 points (3.66%) less democratic than their right-wing counterparts. In
other words, these analyses consistently show that legacy effects also occur among gen-
erations who grew up after authoritarian rule.
We perform a nonlinear analysis to evaluate whether legacy effects on the shape
of the relation between citizens’ ideological and democratic beliefs survive pro-
cesses of generational replacement (Figure 5). We may conclude that legacy
effects persist if the value of the effective degrees of freedom of the coefficient
for citizens’ left-right orientation is lower than that in countries with a democratic
legacy. Here, too, we find strong evidence that our hypothesized legacy effects
persist across generations. The left panels in Figure 5 show that in former left-
authoritarian countries, the relation is both more linear among citizens who
have not (edf =2.08) and citizens who have (edf = 6.86) experienced authoritarian
rule than among citizens in countries with a democratic legacy (edf =8.73). The
right panels mirror these findings for countries with a right-authoritarian legacy.
These panels show that the relation between citizens’ ideological and democratic
Figure 4. Linear test of generational difference. Source. European and World Values Survey (1994-2008).
Notes. Entries are the result of multilevel analyses with observations nested in countries. Figure shows the normally distributed
sampling distributions, derived from 90% bootstrapped confidence intervals (iterations = 10.000, seed = 1993). The intercept is
not included in the visualization to increase the readability of the results. The ‘independent variable’ of the analyses is ‘left-right
orientation’ when the dependent variable is democratic support and ‘democratic support’ when the dependent variable is ‘left-
right orientation.
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beliefs is considerably more linear among citizens who have not experienced
authoritarian rule (edf =7.11) and those who have (edf =5.95) than among citizens
in countries with a democratic legacy (edf =8.73).
What can we learn from these findings? If we take a closer look at the left panels of
Figure 5, we see that in former left-authoritarian countries, deviations from linearity
among citizens with direct exposure to authoritarianism are mostly located on the left
side of the ideological spectrum. The right panels, by contrast, show that these deviations
exist on both sides in former right-authoritarian countries. This observation yields an
especially important conclusion. It tells us that the second type of legacy effect, that is
the desire of citizens with a negative reading of the past to disassociate with the authoritar-
ian and ideological beliefs of the regime, only exists in former right-authoritarian countries.
Discussion
Who opposes democracy? Despite growing concerns over the future of democracy,
there is surprisingly little popular and scholarly agreement regarding the ideological
Figure 5. Nonlinear test of generational differences.
Notes. Figures are the result of Generalized Additive Mixed Models, with a smoothed spline function estimation for citizens’ left-
right orientation (knots = 10). The grey bound represents a 95% confidence interval around the predicted value. The edf-statistic
can be read as a measure of linearity. The lower the value of this statistic, the more linear a relation is.
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alignment of less democratic citizens. Most point to the ideological extremes as the
main source of lower support. Others believe that lower support is exclusively concen-
trated on the right end. In this study, we proposed, tested and demonstrated the val-
idity of another model, called the “authoritarian legacy model”. We showed that
whether lower support is located on the left side, the right side or both sides of the
ideological spectrum depends on historical experiences with left- or right-
authoritarianism.
Our findings play well to several longstanding debates in political science. Theoreti-
cally, our study shows that the models political psychology has developed to study
ideological rigidity are unsuitable for studying democratic support. To be sure, the
overwhelming empirical evidence in favour of the authoritarian legacy model does
not disprove any of the theoretical arguments fielded in political psychology. Citizens’
ideological and democratic beliefs may still very well be rooted in their cognitive rigid-
ity. Instead, this study should be viewed as an invitation for scholars working in this
field to take into account the historical background of a country, at least when studying
democratic support. That is, we show that the validity of the predictions made by
earlier ideological rigidity models is a matter of context. For example, our findings
provide support for the “rigidity-of-the-extremes” hypothesis, but only in countries
with a democratic legacy. Likewise, we found support for the “rigidity-of-the-right”
hypothesis, but only in former right-authoritarian countries.
Our study also offers two additions to extant research on authoritarian legacy
effects. First, we theorized a novel type of legacy effect, caused by citizens’ desire to dis-
associate with the ideological and authoritarian beliefs of the past regime. We investi-
gated this by studying legacy effects on the shape of the relation between left-right
orientation and democratic support. Our findings provide compelling evidence for
this refinement of earlier theories. Our nonlinear analyses revealed that rightist
beliefs imply stronger support for democracy in former left-authoritarian countries,
as much as leftist beliefs imply weaker support. Inversely, leftist beliefs indicated
higher support in former right-authoritarian countries, as much as rightist beliefs indi-
cated weaker support. A second, related, contribution is that that this extension
enabled us to theorize legacy effects that are not only relevant in the context of new
democracies. Our findings provided evidence that the authoritarian past structures
the association between left-right orientation and democratic support in former
authoritarian countries, old and new democracies alike.
The findings of our study are also empirically relevant for multiple reasons. In
general, our findings confirm that the ideological beliefs of less democratic citizens
are more similar in former authoritarian countries than elsewhere. Although not
necessarily opposed to democratic government, these citizens may be swayed to
support authoritarianism if they feel democratic government does not cater to their
psychological needs or ideological interests. This means that an important condition
for the mobilization of less democratic citizens is more strongly fulfilled in these
countries than elsewhere. Moreover, we found that legacy effects are durable and do
not disappear along the process of generational replacement. This conclusion is
especially valuable, given that many other authoritarian legacy effects do tend to
fade with generational replacement.32 In effect, our study suggests that legacy are
more than just a short-term product of democratic transition and may help reactionary
and democratic activist movements mobilize citizens decades later. This may explain
why parties with an ideological link to the authoritarian past do not only have a stable
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basis in new democracies, such as the Czechian Communist Party of Bohemia and
Moravia (KSČM) but also in established democracies, such as the German National
Democratic Party (NPD).
Methodologically, this study offers two contributions arising from our decision to
develop a nonlinear test of our expectations. First, using nonparametric methods
enabled us to drop preconceptions regarding the shape of the relation between citizens’
democratic and ideological beliefs. Lifting these constraints enabled us to achieve
higher levels of confidence regarding the shape of effects than a theoretically informed
model specification would. This exploratory feature of nonparametric methods is
especially valuable in studies like ours, in which there are various conflicting theoreti-
cal claims about the shape of a relation. Second, this approach permitted us to propose
a novel way to study legacy effects. We argued and empirically demonstrated that the
authoritarian past resulted in a more linear relation between citizens’ democratic and
ideological beliefs. Besides, the exploratory nature of these analyses also enabled us to
formulate more nuanced conclusions that would have gone unnoticed using only para-
metric methods. For instance, we did not find any evidence that more democratic citi-
zens who experienced left-authoritarian rule were more inclined to identify with
rightist ideological beliefs. By contrast, we did find evidence that more democratic citi-
zens who experienced right-authoritarian rule were more inclined to identify with
leftist ideological beliefs. This observation necessarily invites us to reflect on the
reason why this is not the case in former left-authoritarian countries. A possible
reason is that left-wing regimes were more consistent in their efforts to indoctrinate
the masses than right-wing regimes. This regime characteristic may contribute to
the homogenization, rather than polarization, of public opinion. This may explain
why individual legacy effects are only found on the left side of the ideological spectrum.
Further theorization and analysis on shape effects may, therefore, yield more nuanced
conclusions about the influence of countries’ authoritarian past.
This tentative suggestion necessarily brings us to the discussion of other limitations
and avenues for future research. First, in the theorization of legacy effects, we focused
on countries with either a legacy of right- or left- authoritarianism. In effect, the argu-
ments put forward here cannot be applied to countries with competing authoritarian
(left- and right-wing) legacies, such as Hungary and East Germany. In these rare cases,
both the left- and the right end of the ideological spectrum are tainted by an anti-
democratic connotation. It is, therefore, unclear what the empirical implications for
mass political behaviour would be. However, qualitative analysis of these cases can
be very instructive, and they may even help further refine our theory. Knowledge on
how citizens’ deal with these competing pressures may help us better understand
which type of regime traces (e.g. reference in political debate, memorial sites,
museums, popular culture) prevail in citizens’ considerations. Second, it is important
to note that our finding that leftist citizens are less democratic in former left-author-
itarian countries seems to be at odds with the observation that radical right parties are
flourishing in some of these countries (for instance PiS in Poland). We believe that the
reason for this is that the left-authoritarian past has enabled the radical right to acquire
a pro-democratic reputation. This argument can be loosely substantiated by the fact
that PiS entered the electoral arena as a pro-democratic party with a strong anti-com-
munist rhetoric. This rhetoric may have permitted this party to ward off accusations of
political extremism. More research is necessary to investigate whether this is the case.
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Despite these shortcomings, it is clear that the implications of this study reach
beyond the question which citizens are more likely to oppose democracy. Contrary
to earlier research on legacy effects, our study shows that the authoritarian past estab-
lishes lasting and society-wide effects, that will not simply vanish with generational
replacement. As such, this study tells us a great deal about the mobilization potential
of reactionary and democratic activist movements across different countries.
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